RFS holds meeting on Conjola area bushfire disaster

Residents took the chance to ask questions about the disaster on New Year's Eve, which saw 89 homes at Conjola Park destroyed by the Currowan fire.

A recent online meeting hosted by the Rural Fire Service (RFS) gave the residents the chance to get some answers to their questions.

Backburn operations and the handling of firefighting resources were among their questions.

The meeting explained, with or without a backburn operation, the fire was always going to be brutal.

It was stated the backburn was not the cause of the destruction.

The RFS took the "we have nothing to hide approach" and answered all the questions as best they could.

The residents' questions and RFS' answers are stated below.

RFS incident controller, Mark Williams, started the meeting by explaining how firefighters took on the Curawain Fire.

He first paid respect to the three people who passed away in the disaster.

Mr Williams said the fire affected many people.

"We had a great deal of success with the efforts we put in. Many areas were successfully defended and fire impact was reduced or removed entirely," he said.

"Unfortunately, however, despite the very best efforts of all involved, we were not always successful."

He said weather conditions and dry fuel-loads affected the behaviour of the fire.

Mr Williams explained how the fierce fire even created its own weather pattern with extreme fire spotting.

"What we saw with this event was spot fires occurring a record 12 kilometres away from the main fire front," he said.

Mr Williams said after the fire comes the recovery.

"For some, the recovery might take months - for others, it will be years. There is no time limit," he said.

Mr Williams and the RFS know the Conjola community, as part of its recovery has questions about the fire.

The questions are part of the community's recovery process, as they search for an explanation.

"I have become aware and the RFS has become aware there are concerns within the local community especially around the Conjola area in relation to the circumstances leading up to and during the devastating New Year's Eve fire," Mr Williams said.

He added, given the size of the fire, people were told not to expect an appliance at each property

"Given the size the ferocity as well as the amount of fire across the landscape of NSW, it was not a realistic expectation," he said

December 31 was a day of many emergency alerts in many sections in the Shoalhaven and at 12.19pm the fire was reported to be approaching Conjola Park and by 2pm, the third emergency report had been issued for all areas.

The RFS's regional coordinator for region east, Mathew O'Donnell, was asked to investigate the circumstance around the backburn that took place in and around the Conjola Park area.

He looked into the timeframe and the circumstances about what happened on December 31.

He said it was not a physical investigation as they were not on the ground looking at the evidence but instead was a review of the incident records, the mapping the line scanners and various interviews.

By the evening of December 30, the backburning operation in the Milton and Wandandian areas were largely completed, the gathering was told.

Crews had been mopping up around the backburn in the Martin's Ridge area.

December 31 at 9.50am scans picked up a significant increase of fire activity in the Martin Ridge area.

Weather conditions were not good for firefighters, Mr O'Donnell said.

"Crews even before 6am were reporting a significant deterioration in the conditions and an escalation in fire activity was experienced," he said.

Multiple triple zero calls from 11am from Golden Flats and Porters Creek Roads area along with Little Forrest Road were received with reports the fire was spotting over the Princes Highway, which it did by 12pm in the Myrtle Gully area.

Mr O'Donnell said evidence suggests the initial spotting was in the Myrtle Gully area.

By 12.20pm, the fire was impacting properties on the western end of Lake Conjola Entrance Road.

"By 12.40pm there are multiple triple zero calls from the residents within Conjola Park suggesting initial ember attack on the village from the northwest interface of Conjola Park," Mr O'Donnell said.

"It was likely a spot fire came over the fire in the Myrtle Gully area.

"By 2pm in the afternoon, a fire generated thunderstorm was observed over the Currowan fire, west of Nowra.

"This resulted in a significant escalation in the fire activity, with it continuing to impact to the Conjola Park community before spreading rapidly through the Narrawallee Nature Creek reserve."

The fire then went out towards the coast.

Fire behaviour analysts were also engaged to undertake some modelling to determine whether the backburning in the Porters Creek Rd area had been effective in preventing impact on the coastal communities and also looking at what would have happened with and without the backburn.

With the information, which included weather forecast, the backburn was expected to be effective under the given forecast conditions and did not indicate extension out to the coast.

"What was concluded here by our analysts was with or without the backburn, under the extreme conditions observed on December 31, was the fire was going to cross the highway and make a hard run out to the coast," Mr O'Donnell said.

He added further study shows the conditions on the day were so extreme and far away from the forecast - similar to the conditions that decimated Nerriga.

Conditions by 10am on the December 31 in Nerriga had already been classed as catastrophic.

"The observed conditions on December 31 were extraordinary - they exceeded the forecast for Ulladulla and most closely matched to Nerriga," Mr O'Donnell said.

Mr O'Donnell said the impact on Conjola Park was likely to have come from a spot over on the powerline section near Golden Flats Lane, which in turn came from the main fire-front in the Martin Ridge area.

"However, a spot fire from the backburn once the weather conditions had deteriorated, can't be ruled out," he said.

This finding was based on triple zero calls, interviews from crews in the field, the review of the mapping and other intelligence that was gathered.

He added the backburn would have been effective under the forecast conditions for Ulladulla but the observed conditions exceeded the forecast and lowered the probability of success of the backburn

"The findings from the fire behaviour analysts are the backburn is not believed to have exacerbated the situation," he said.

Why was there a strategic backburn along Porters Creek Dam Road and out to Bloodwood Road?

Response by Mark Willliams.

"To make sure we had a continuous line of defence, backburns were undertaken, which is a normal part of firefighting but potential gaps in the line could see the fire go straight through and continue onwards. There are always risks associated with backburning."

He added the crews worked outstandingly throughout the operation and added their work was unbelievable.

What on ground intelligence and situational awareness was provided and by whom to make the decision for the backburn and to what extent did that take into account local knowledge?

Response by Mark Willliams.

"Local volunteers were involved and the land managers played a vital role in advising on the fuel and their subsequent treatments. History was another aspect they looked at and how it was contained in the past. Regular reports are received from the fire ground crews in relation to the weather conditions, fuel loads they are experiencing and preparation of the property around the area."

I would like to know why the backburn on Porters Creek Road Dam went ahead when the residents there did not want it because of the weather conditions?

Mark Williams understood the feeling behind the question and said: "on the day what they saw was the need to get the containment line in and make it complete while getting that depth of backburn in as soon as they could to afford better protection".

What risk assessment was done to take into account the already extremely dangerous conditions and the predicted catastrophic change?

Response by Mark Willliams.

"Risk assessment was paramount, no matter what operations are being undertaken and they have a calculated process to work through. They look at risk versus reward, risk not only to firefighters but also to the communities they are trying to protect. The risk assessment is ongoing - they are not just made at the one time, it's done on a daily basis, by the crews out there which are reported to the incident management team. The probability of success is one of the things they look at. If we did not go ahead, our line would have been a lot weaker. Ultimately the line was breached and we saw those extraordinary weather circumstances that came through and pushed that fire straight up and over the backburns we put in. If we got the predicted weather, the line might have held but this just can't be determined. It was the best opportunity to remove the fuel in front of the fire and reduce the impact of the fire on the line at the time.

One RFS member of the panel said they could do better when it came to risk assessments.

Did the backburn accelerate the fire through the villages?

Matt O'Donnell took the question and said "no". "The clear advice from the fire behaviour analysts, who run the modelling after the fact as part of the investigation, was there was no difference when a backburn was put in and when a backburn was not put in. The backburn, under the modelling that was taken, did not exacerbate the fire spreading to those coastal villages."

The manner of things was going to stop the fire from going through the village, the meeting was told. The meeting was told it was not just normal spot fire but significant fireball type spot fires. The RFS accepts communities like the ones in Conjola are feeling anger. However, in some areas, the backburn held and held for a significant amount of time.

Did crews say no to lighting the backburn but were ordered to so by their superiors?

"No, not that I am aware of," Mark Williams said.

He added "open dialogue does take place, including talking about 'less than ideal conditions' but once again he said they did their work famously. All evidence suggests that backburns on December 30 were secured in the Porters Ridge area".

Open and transparent - with nothing to hide, the RFS is always prepared to look at any information the public has in relation to the fire. The meeting was told the process was not to interview the volunteers or the paid personnel on the ground. After action reviews are carried out by the crews and they get set up through the various RFS group levels.

Are you saying you took a decision and it was wrong and human error caused the deviation?

"Yes, ultimately I did make a decision and it was an educated decision with the advice from the indecent management team," Mr Williams said. "Was it wrong? I don't believe it was wrong. I believe we looked at the circumstances and the risk assessment and put the line in place - from the people on the fire ground through to every member of the incident management team, all thought the campaign was done in the best interest of the community that we are trying to protect. Not once did we look at anything in the light of malice as it was done to try to protect the community. We did everything we possibly could by putting the backburn in to give the most amount of protection possible to the local communities right throughout that line - not just the Conjola area right around the Currawan fire.

Why wasn't the decision regarding divesting so many fire trucks and assets south down to Batemans Bay on the morning of News Year Eve around 8am not reevaluated at around 10am and then deployed back to the area?

"The reality was by 3am that morning, the fire was bearing down on Cobargo and destroying that community, the meeting was told. The devastation included the loss of life. "They were of the most absolute need," a RFS spokesperson said.

"When word came about the situation back up in the Shoalhaven, a massive number of resources from the surrounding areas were sent to the local region. Resources were stretched to the limit and decisions had to be made. The reality was we had a massive amount of fire occurring up and down the east coast. The RFS did everything 'humanly possible' to get the resource to areas like Conjola as best they could. The fire was described as a resource-hungry beast. Aircraft could not fly under the difficult conditions.

Some questions could not be answered as the RFS did not have the specific information it required, including the alleged loss of water. Many questions came regarding why fire-trucks were moved away from Conjola Park and up to Milton?

Mr Williams said he could understand how people must be feeling.

"I can't describe the feeling a firefighter goes through when they can't assist enough. There was only so many resources and they were all heavily engaged. I personally wish we could have done a hell of a lot more but given the resources we had available and the number of communities that were under the impact, those conditions meant the crews did an amazing job. It cuts deep and I really feel for people but we did everything we possibly could."

Investigations are ongoing.